How water is becoming a new pressure point in India-Pakistan relations

Designed to help manage the waters of South Asia’s Indus Basin, it allocates India control of the Eastern Rivers (the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) and Pakistan control of the Western Rivers (the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab), while allowing limited use of the waters allocated to the other party. 

Its suspension continues to generate friction, with water security increasingly becoming a feature of the broader geopolitical dispute between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.  Recent accusations from Islamabad that India is “weaponizing” water, including reports of abrupt changes in flows from the Chenab River, highlight how resource management is becoming an additional pressure point alongside longstanding security concerns in the disputed Kashmir region. 

While the dispute remains primarily political, organisations operating in South Asia should be aware that prolonged tensions could affect infrastructure planning, humanitarian conditions, cross-border trade dynamics and the broader operating environment in parts of India and Pakistan.

Water dispute reflects wider deterioration in bilateral relations

Relations between India and Pakistan have remained strained since the April 2025 attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that killed 26 tourists. India blamed Pakistan-based militants for the attack, while Pakistan denied involvement. The incident prompted India to unilaterally suspend its participation in the IWT, a move that Pakistan argues has no legal basis under the agreement's provisions. 

The fallout extended beyond diplomatic tensions. The relationship has experienced a marked deterioration, with further restrictions on travel and trade, including the continued ban on Indian airlines flying over Pakistani airspace. 

Although major hostilities have subsided, political relations remain largely frozen, despite indications that unofficial and semi-official dialogue channels remain active and continued calls from civil society groups on both sides for the restoration of formal diplomatic engagement.

Growing concerns over the "weaponization" of water

Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of manipulating water flows along the Chenab River since suspending IWT cooperation. Reported fluctuations in river flows have led Pakistani officials to argue that reduced transparency and data-sharing increase the risk of both flooding and water shortages, impacting Pakistan’s farming, agriculture, and food security. 

Speaking at the international IWT seminar in June 2026, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar warned that using water as a political tool could have severe implications for regional stability. He reiterated Islamabad's position that any attempt to divert, interrupt or significantly reduce Pakistan's allocated water supplies would constitute an act of aggression with serious security implications for the region. 

Pakistan's concerns are amplified by its heavy dependence on the Indus river system. Agriculture accounts for a significant proportion of national employment and relies heavily on predictable river flows. Any prolonged disruption to water supplies could generate substantial humanitarian and economic consequences.

The active El Niño weather system is affecting rainfall patterns at a time when water is already becoming a source of political tension. By increasing variability in monsoon activity, intensifying drought conditions, and contributing to the fluctuating of river flows across the Indus Basin, El Niño is heightening water security concerns for both countries. 

For Pakistan, the risks are particularly acute. As the downstream state, it fears any disruption to upstream flows could worsen water shortages, while sudden water releases from Indian-controlled dams could increase the risk of localised flash flooding. Against this backdrop, the continued suspension of the treaty has introduced further uncertainty into an already fragile bilateral relationship.

Infrastructure development and hydro-political competition

As geopolitical rivalry, infrastructure competition and climate stress converge, water security is emerging as a critical driver of risk in South Asia. 

India has justified its suspension of the treaty by citing evolving security requirements, demographic pressures and the need to accelerate infrastructure and clean-energy development. New Delhi has also indicated plans to expand dam and hydropower projects within the Indus Basin. 

For Pakistan, these projects raise concerns that India could gain greater control over river flows entering Pakistani territory. Pakistani officials have argued that expanded water infrastructure could give New Delhi greater leverage in future conflicts, reinforcing perceptions that water is becoming an instrument of strategic competition rather than cross-border cooperation. 

The dispute reflects a growing global trend whereby environmental resources are increasingly intersecting with geopolitical rivalries. As climate pressures, population growth and infrastructure demands intensify across South Asia, water security is likely to become an even more prominent component of national security planning in both countries.

A guardrail under pressure

While a major military confrontation remains unlikely, the erosion of the IWT removes one of the few remaining guardrails in the India–Pakistan relationship.

The treaty has survived multiple conflicts since 1960 and has historically functioned as a stabilising mechanism even during periods of heightened political tension. Its gradual weakening carries significance beyond water management alone.

The principal near-term risk is not necessarily armed conflict, but the continued deterioration of technical cooperation and information sharing. Reduced communication regarding dam operations, water releases, and hydrological data could heighten flood risks, exacerbate drought conditions, and increase the potential for miscalculation that impacts local populations. 

With India’s other major transboundary river agreement - the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty with Bangladesh - due for renewal in December, the intersection of water security, climate pressures and regional cooperation has never been more relevant for policymakers and businesses alike.

Organisations with operational, supply chain or infrastructure exposure in South Asia should continue to monitor developments in cross-border water management, including the future of the IWT and the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, as well as broader regional relations. 

Water security is becoming increasingly intertwined with regional geopolitical dynamics, creating a complex risk environment that extends beyond traditional political and security concerns. Although an immediate escalation remains unlikely, the growing securitisation of water resources increases the risk of diplomatic confrontation, humanitarian disruption and broader instability in an already geopolitically sensitive region.