What's happening: Tigray clashes raise the risk of renewed instability

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The clashes mark one of the most serious confrontations between the Federal Government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) since the 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement ended the two-year civil war.

Details remain contested. Both sides have accused the other of initiating hostilities, while reports suggest artillery, drones, and air power were used. No verified casualty figures have been released, although the scale and duration of the fighting suggest significant losses are likely. Wounded fighters and civilians reportedly crossed into Sudan, with Sudan's refugee commission also reporting that projectiles landed in refugee camps, causing fatalities and casualties.

Allegations of involvement remain unverified; reports identified the Sudan-based TPLF Army 70 and the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) as belligerents, while others also allege involvement from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. Neither the Federal Government nor the ENDF has issued an official statement. However, Minister Abraham Belay acknowledged the clashes on social media, blamed the TPLF, warned of further consequences and called for negotiations.

The clashes expose unresolved drivers of conflict

The clashes are currently not assessed as indicating a return to full-scale conflict as seen pre-2022; however, the nature and scale of the clashes involving significant numbers of troops and air capabilities, combined with artillery, indicate a significant increase in the intensity of tensions. Multiple further clashes of the same scale over the coming weeks may indicate a return to full-scale conflict. This highlights the fragility of the post-2022 security environment and demonstrate that several of the issues underpinning the civil war remain unresolved. 

The political status of Western Tigray remains contested, while relations between Addis Ababa and the TPLF have deteriorated further following the TPLF's exclusion from the June federal elections and ongoing disputes over funding, aid, fuel, and salary payments. 

Regional tensions further increase the complexity. Addis Ababa continues to accuse the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of supporting TPLF-linked elements, while the SAF-aligned government accuses Ethiopia of facilitating UAE-coordinated drone operations. Although allegations of involvement by the RSF, SAF, or Eritrean forces remain unverified, confirmation of participation by any of these actors in recent clashes would represent a significant expansion of the conflict. 

Assessment remains constrained by a degraded information environment and limited independent reporting from northern Ethiopia, alongside competing information, with both sides disseminating highly politicised and, at times, outdated narratives. However, available reporting suggests the environment remains vulnerable to further deterioration despite the absence of a return to full-scale conflict. 

What this means for organisations

Organisations with personnel, operations or supply-chain exposure in Tigray, Amhara, or border areas with Sudan are likely to face heightened access and business continuity risks. 

Access remains the primary concern. Foreign nationals are restricted from flying to Tigray and Afar, while Ethiopian Airlines services to northern airports remain vulnerable to short-notice disruption. Following drone strikes in January, flight operations were suspended immediately and resumed after a five-day period. 

Overland movement remains challenging. Most routes into Tigray pass through Amhara, which recorded more than 60 security incidents during the same week, including a drone strike that killed 17 civilians. Banking and telecommunications services in Tigray were also suspended during the January escalation and could be disrupted again should tensions worsen. 

Exposure extends into Sudan, particularly in Gedaref and Kassala states, which host Ethiopian refugees near the border.

Organisations without personnel, operations or supply-chain exposure in northern Ethiopia or the Sudan border region are unlikely to face direct impacts at this stage. 

Most likely scenario

Further small-scale localised clashes are assessed as more likely over the coming weeks than a return to full-scale conflict through continued large-scale clashes. This assessment is based on the geographically contained nature of the 1st August clashes, the absence of reported hostilities since, and subsequent calls for negotiations. 

The rainy season (Kiremt), which typically lasts until October, may constrain large-scale mechanised operations by limiting movement and logistics in the coming months. It additionally reduces the effectiveness of air and drone operations, which may encourage the TPLF owing to the weather restricting the superior ENDF air capabilities. 

However, unresolved disputes over Western Tigray, continued tensions between Addis Ababa and the TPLF, and broader regional frictions mean that a broader resumption of hostilities cannot be ruled out, particularly over the medium term.

Indicators of improvement

• Resumption of African Union or US-led mediation efforts, both of which engaged with Tigray in July.
• Restoration of federal budget transfers, salary payments, and fuel supplies to Tigray.
• Publication of casualty and displacement figures by independent monitors, indicating improved humanitarian and monitoring access.
• Sustained public engagement between federal authorities and the TPLF aimed at reducing tensions and advancing negotiations.

Indicators of deterioration

• Renewed fighting in Shererina or the emergence of a second front, indicating a broader campaign rather than an isolated incident.
• Suspension of flights to Mekelle, Shire, Axum, or Humera, which have previously served as a leading indicator of escalation.
• Cross-border displacement into Sudan increasing from hundreds to thousands of people.
• Confirmed federal strikes against Army 70 positions inside Sudan, signalling a wider regionalisation of the conflict.
• Independent confirmation of RSF, SAF, or Eritrean military involvement.
• Official statements from Federal Government indicating preparedness for full-scale conflict.

Recommended actions

• Monitor trusted intelligence to stay abreast of developments and consider deferring travel or scaling down operations in Tigray amid deterioration of the security environment.
• Review and update business continuity and evacuation plans for operations, personnel, or supply chains in Tigray, Amhara, and the Gondar-Humera and Gondar-Shire corridors.
• Verify Ethiopian Airlines schedules to northern airports directly, as flight restrictions can be imposed at short notice.
• Treat claims regarding casualty figures, attribution, and the scale of fighting as unverified until independently confirmed.
• Brief travelling staff that access restrictions can be implemented with limited warning and that flights to Tigray and Afar remain restricted for foreign nationals.

For risk managers: Configure Sentinel to receive ongoing monitoring and reporting on developments.

For organisation-specific guidance: Contact the Healix GSOC for tailored assessment and advice.