What we learnt from the Trump-Xi summit in Beijing

It was Trump’s first visit to China since 2017, during his first term in the Oval Office. Outside the pomp and lavish ceremonies, the summit provided several insights into key sticking points in the critical US-China relationship. Most of these signalled continuity rather than change. 

Trade remains a key focus, with limited progress

Trade was the primary focus for Trump and the US delegation, which was comprised of several CEOs and businesspeople. Over recent years, trade wars, tariffs and threats to de-couple have characterised the relationship. The truce agreement in October 2025 temporarily alleviated concerns and provided the platform for further trade discussions. Following the summit, Trump claimed that the US and China had reached agreements on several trade deals. China later stated these deals were in their preliminary stages. New boards of trade and investment were announced, which will reportedly negotiate on tariff-related disputes. 

Incremental steps fall short of commercial expectations

Trump will almost certainly frame the trip as a success, particularly on market access for US agricultural products and Boeing aircraft. However, the countries remain at a stalemate with the trade truce, and China did not purchase as many agricultural products or aircraft as US investors anticipated. The lack of tangible progress was expected, but the summit did provide some level of certainty for businesses and supply chains prior to Xi’s expected trip to Washington in September. 

Taiwan continues to dominate strategic discussions

Xi was clear on Taiwan. China continues to assert Taiwan is part of China and adamantly refuses to recognise any claims of independence. Citing the Thucydides Trap, a theory which seeks to explain the structural conditions that can lead to war between a rising and established global power, Xi warned Trump that mistakes over Taiwan could lead to an escalation. Xi also stated that Taiwan is the most important issue in China-US relations and reportedly attempted to gauge Trump’s position on coming to Taiwan’s defence.  

Trump acted cautiously on Taiwan during the summit. Trump’s behaviour was relatively consistent with Washington’s long-term policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, which is deliberately vague in committing to US military intervention if Taiwan is attacked. The US remains legally obligated to support Taiwan with military equipment via the Taiwan Relations Act and recently committed to providing Taiwan with a US$11 billion package. Since the summit, Taiwan has reiterated the importance of the defence partnership with the US and the latter’s legal obligations.  

The US maintains a cautious and ambiguous position

In the days following, Trump has been non-committal on future US arms sales, described weapons sales as a useful negotiating chip, and also warned Taiwan against declaring independence. In a likely misstep rather than purposeful policy change, Trump also suggested he would liaise with Taiwanese President William Lai over arms sales, an unprecedented move that would rattle China and almost certainly prompt some form of coercive response.  

Trump is unlikely to significantly delay further arms sales to Taiwan following the summit despite Xi’s warnings. The summit likely did not produce enough meaningful trade deals with China to facilitate bargaining over Taiwan’s future. Further, the defence of Taiwan still generates rare bipartisan support in the US, and Trump has previously signed off on arms deals with Taiwan despite Chinese pressure. Cross-strait relations are highly unlikely to shift on the basis of this summit’s developments. 

Beijing was unlikely to create a noticeable wedge in the US-Taiwan defence relationship during the summit. However, Xi will almost certainly have persisted with China’s longer-term approach of gradually weakening the US-Taiwan defence relationship. Xi will likely view Trump’s most recent indecision over future US arms sales to Taiwan as a near-term victory for further alienating Taiwan, casting uncertainty over its most important defence relationship and signalling to the Taiwanese population that resistance to China’s rise will be futile. Grey-zone tactics – military activity below the threshold of direct conflict – will almost certainly continue to be leveraged by China to apply further pressure on Taiwan and regional partners.  

The Middle East conflict shapes the broader context

China-US relations have been increasingly impacted by the ongoing Middle East conflict. After all, the summit was initially scheduled for 31 March to 2 April, but was postponed due to the conflict. China has been critical of the war and the disruption caused – China buys large amounts of Iranian oil and is vulnerable to blockades in the Strait. China also maintains a relatively cooperative relationship with Iran, which has frustrated Washington.  

Trump claims he is on the same page with Xi over Iran. Both supposedly want to see an end to the war, the full re-opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the permanent non-proliferation of Iran. On the condition of additional Chinese support, Trump suggested sanctions directed at Chinese companies refining Iranian oil could be eased. Despite Trump’s assertions, China has been relatively mute on details over Middle East discussions. Prior to the summit, Iran allowed more Chinese vessels to transit through the Strait.  

The summit is unlikely to significantly alter the course of peace negotiations. No major indicators were met that suggest the conflict is any closer to a conclusion, even though both sides may agree on basic principles. China is likely to continue favouring low-key diplomatic efforts, with the summit not suggesting any observable shifts to China’s strategy. China likely favours US military entanglement outside Asia, and knows extensive oil reserves and energy diversification away from Iran will probably limit China’s longer-term exposure to conflict-induced shocks.  

A stable but unresolved outlook for businesses

Developments over trade, Taiwan and the Middle East represent commitments to a tense but manageable status-quo in China-US relations. Neither side has an incentive to undermine the relationship’s stability over the coming months, especially in the context of domestic economic challenges and Xi’s reciprocal trip to Washington planned for September. China appears content with gradually weakening Taiwan’s military and political resolve, while the US is focused on finding a satisfactory end to the conflict with Iran. Both can point to limited but positive outcomes from the summit to their domestic audiences, particularly on trade. 

Organisations in the Asia-Pacific should view the recent summit with cautious optimism. Short-term strategic stability offers time and opportunities for businesses to reconsider supply chains and their vulnerabilities to a sudden deterioration in the relationship. This remains a very real possibility into 2027, as both sides remain far apart on reconciling over many key issues. Reducing exposure to single points of failure and diversifying supply chains will be critical in a region that is heavily defined by simmering China-US competition.  

The summit reflects a reality in which geopolitical risks are increasingly converging to impact organisations and travellers. Proactively monitoring and taking advantage of geopolitical developments will build more resilient teams that can make decisions with greater clarity and confidence. Blind spots to geopolitical issues, particularly with the US-China relationship, will almost certainly challenge the ability for organisations to prepare for and respond to escalations.