What's happening: Yemen conflict raises risks to Saudi infrastructure

---

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, launched an offensive to expand their control over strategic areas of western Yemen amid wider regional hostilities and tensions linked to restrictions on flights into Sana’a.

By early September, the Houthis had seized the port of Mokha and were advancing towards positions around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces launched a major counteroffensive, named ‘Dawn of Yemen’, on 5 October.

Government forces subsequently claimed to have retaken Mokha and other key positions around the Strait, although the Houthis deny these claims. Saudi air and naval forces have also intensified operations against Houthi targets across Yemen.

Cross-border hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia had largely paused under an informal lull established in March 2022. However, this period of relative calm ended on 13 July, when the Houthis fired missiles towards Saudi Arabia following alleged Saudi-coordinated strikes on Sana’a airport.

The latest fighting has increased pressure around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, an important maritime chokepoint connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Although the conflict has been influenced by wider regional hostilities, its immediate drivers remain rooted in local territorial and political objectives.

The conflict has entered a phase of sustained military operations

Both the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition have increased the frequency and geographic scope of their attacks. Houthi strikes have targeted locations including Abha, Jazan, Najran, Khamis Mushait, Riyadh and Rabigh, focusing largely on aviation, energy and military infrastructure.

Drone attacks that Saudi Arabia attributed to Iraqi militias on 10 September prompted the temporary closure of the East-West Pipeline and halted crude loadings at Yanbu for more than two weeks. Missile and drone attacks have also affected Aramco-linked facilities, causing fires and temporary disruption.

Houthi advances along the Red Sea coast prompted the Saudi-backed counteroffensive around Mokha and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Government forces have also indicated plans for an offensive towards Sana’a, which remains under Houthi control.

Following the escalation in Saudi-led air operations, the Houthis reiterated warnings for international airlines to avoid Saudi airspace, most recently on 8 October, calling it a “last warning”. These warnings do not indicate that countrywide aviation disruption is imminent, but they demonstrate the group’s continued capability and intent to threaten Saudi aviation and infrastructure.

The conflict could evolve differently if government forces consolidate their positions around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait or advance towards Sana’a. A major territorial threat to the Houthis would likely shift the group’s focus towards defending its core areas inside Yemen, potentially reducing the resources available for cross-border operations. However, it would also intensify fighting within Yemen and create new opportunities for regional escalation.

What this means for organisations

Organisations in the energy sector face the greatest direct exposure. The Houthis maintain the capability and intent to target Saudi critical infrastructure, particularly energy, aviation and military sites. Personnel and assets in south-western and central Saudi Arabia face the highest risk, especially near transport networks and energy facilities.

The East-West Pipeline remains operational at the time of writing, with Saudi Arabia reporting flows of 5.8 million barrels on 6 October following the temporary disruption at Yanbu. However, further attacks could produce short-notice interruptions to production, transport or loading operations.

Aviation disruption on a countrywide scale has so far remained limited. Recent Houthi targeting patterns, alongside repeated warnings for international airlines to avoid Saudi airspace, indicate an increasing focus on aviation infrastructure in addition to military, energy, and other critical infrastructure targets. The risk of delays, rerouting and cancellations will increase if attacks against Saudi airports become more frequent, cause significant infrastructure damage or trigger additional operational restrictions. Airlines may also adjust schedules and flight paths before that threshold is reached.

A countrywide closure of Saudi airspace remains unlikely under current conflict conditions. Localised airport disruption, temporary airspace restrictions and flight rerouting around affected areas are more plausible, including around King Khalid International Airport.

Maritime insecurity also presents a significant operational concern. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has increased the strategic importance of Red Sea routes for Saudi trade and energy exports. Further instability around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait could lead to shipping delays, route diversions and higher insurance and transport costs, particularly for Saudi-aligned vessels.

Organisations should therefore prepare for possible supply-chain delays, increased operating costs and changes to regional shipping and aviation routes while hostilities continue.

Outlook

Most likely scenario

Houthi attacks are highly likely to continue over the coming weeks in response to the Saudi-backed offensive. Military, aviation and energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia will remain the most likely targets, while Saudi air and naval operations continue along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

There is currently little indication of a diplomatic off-ramp, while Saudi air and naval operations are likely to continue around the Red Sea coast, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Hodeidah. Significant casualties or damage to critical energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, or a government push towards Sana'a would increase escalation risks. 

Disruption to aviation, logistics and maritime operations in south-western and central Saudi Arabia is likely to persist in the near term. Risks to Red Sea shipping are expected to remain elevated, although the Houthis remain intent on avoiding large-scale disruption to international maritime traffic by focusing primarily on Saudi-linked interests. 

Regional escalation remains a realistic possibility if additional actors become directly involved in military operations against the Houthis. 

Most regional actors are still likely to favour indirect support towards Riyadh. However, the activation of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey on 5 October and indication that Syria may send troops for Saudi assistance, increases the likelihood of sustained external support to Riyadh. While this is unlikely to significantly broaden the geographic scope of the conflict in the near term, it could increase the risk of attacks against vessels linked to coalition members operating in the southern Red Sea. The Yemen conflict also remains linked to the wider Iran-Israel-US confrontation. Should Israel or the US become directly involved in military operations against the Houthis, the likelihood of Iranian retaliation against US assets in the region would increase significantly.

Recommended actions

• Review security escalation procedures for personnel and operations in south-western, western and central Saudi Arabia.
• Ensure business continuity plans address possible disruption to aviation, energy infrastructure, communications and Red Sea shipping.
• Confirm that personnel understand local air-raid and shelter procedures, including how to respond to aerial interception activity and falling debris.
• Identify suitable shelter-in-place locations and maintain sufficient emergency supplies at exposed sites.
• Review evacuation and relocation options for deployed personnel and ensure plans reflect the organisation’s risk tolerance.
• Monitor the Saudi Ministry of Defence’s official X account, @modgovksa, alongside trusted intelligence sources for alerts relating to aerial interceptions, strikes and changes to the security environment.
• Reconfirm aviation and maritime arrangements regularly, particularly for journeys or shipments involving the Red Sea coast and southern Red Sea.
• Review supply-chain dependencies and alternative routes in preparation for shipping delays, diversions or increased transport costs
• Account for potential delays in reliable reporting following security incidents and ensure all personnel in-country can be accounted for.

For risk managers: Configure Sentinel to receive ongoing monitoring and reporting on conflict activity in Yemen, cross-border threats to Saudi Arabia and maritime risks in the Red Sea.

For organisation-specific guidance: Contact the Healix GSOC for tailored assessment and advice.