What you need to know about the Ethiopian general election

05.05.2026

Ethiopia will hold national and regional elections on 1 June. While the ruling party is almost certain to retain power, insecurity and political pressure will restrict voting in several regions. As a result, the election is unlikely to reduce conflict risks or improve operating conditions on the ground.

Voters will cast their ballots to elect members of Ethiopia’s House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), the lower house of parliament, for five‑year terms. The election will use a first‑past‑the‑post system.

The Prime Minister is indirectly elected by the HPR. In practice, this means the party that secures a majority of the 547 seats will nominate the Prime Minister and form the government.

Elections will also be held for regional councils across Ethiopia’s twelve ethno‑linguistic regions. Votes will take place in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, which have special administrative status. These regional councils will then elect representatives to the House of Federation, the upper house of parliament.

Who is likely to win the vote

The incumbent Prosperity Party, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, is expected to extend its mandate in the upcoming election.

Since coming to power in 2018, Abiy Ahmed has sought to move Ethiopia away from ethnic federalism. His administration has instead pushed for a more unified and centralised system of governance. This shift was reinforced in 2019 with the formation of the Prosperity Party, which merged several ethnically based political parties into a single national structure.

Ethiopia’s first‑past‑the‑post electoral system strongly favours the incumbent. This makes a landslide victory for the Prosperity Party highly likely, similar to the outcome of the 2021 election.

Key political and security risks ahead of the election

The election is taking place amid rising internal security risks. Ongoing instability in several regions is expected to limit voter turnout and election logistics.

Security conditions remain fragile in parts of Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. In some locations, polling stations may not open at all. These conditions mirror challenges seen during the previous general election.

Several opposition parties have called for a delay to the 1 June vote. They cite insecurity, administrative barriers, and limited access to campaigning venues.

Conflict hotspots and voting disruptions

The Tigray region is excluded from the upcoming vote. Federal and regional forces engaged in open conflict there between 2020 and 2022. Over the past year, tensions between the federal government and Tigrayan authorities have continued to rise, increasing concern about the potential for renewed hostilities.

These tensions intensified following the federal government’s decision on 8 April to extend the mandate of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) by one year. In response, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) declared its willingness to replace TIRA with executive and legislative bodies established after the 2020 regional elections. This development highlights the continued fragility of the political environment in Tigray.

Civic space, opposition pressure and legitimacy risks

Beyond the impact of conflict, opposition groups have criticised the government over the narrowing of civic and political space in recent years.

The Prosperity Party‑dominated parliament has approved a series of restrictive laws. These measures have affected both media organisations and civil society groups. Critics argue that the legislation has limited independent reporting and constrained political activity.

Political tensions have intensified in the lead‑up to the election. On 17 April, a coalition of eight opposition parties threatened to withdraw from the vote. They cited widespread legal violations, intimidation, and administrative irregularities. Their statement highlights ongoing disputes over the conduct and credibility of the electoral process.

These concerns are likely to persist, but they are not expected to alter the overall outcome of the election.

Election risk outlook

The election is likely to reinforce existing political and security conditions rather than drive material change. A renewed mandate for the ruling Prosperity Party is unlikely to alter Ethiopia’s domestic risk environment in the near term.

The electoral process is expected to proceed smoothly in much of the country. However, intimidation by armed groups in conflict‑affected areas will limit participation. As in 2021, this will prevent the election from being fully inclusive.

While the vote may deepen dissatisfaction within some marginalised communities, a sharp increase in unrest is not expected. Security conditions in conflict‑affected regions are likely to persist largely independent of election‑related developments.

Over the longer term, continued political exclusion and unresolved grievances may contribute to recruitment by regional armed groups. As a result, a meaningful improvement in internal conflict risks appears unlikely over the medium term.

Operational and security advice for organisations

Organisations with staff, assets, or partners in Ethiopia should prepare for localised disruption during the election period, particularly around 1 June.

  • Closely monitor reliable local and international news outlets in the lead‑up to and during the election period for political and security updates.
  • Encourage staff to use the Healix Travel Oracle app and add Ethiopia to their watchlist for real‑time country alerts.
  • Anticipate an increased security presence in central areas of major cities, particularly near government buildings and administrative districts. This may affect local access and movement patterns.
  • Reconfirm routes prior to travel on election day, particularly in central urban areas, as traffic restrictions may be implemented with limited notice.
  • Ensure staff in‑country are briefed on the election context and advised to avoid large gatherings, polling areas, and political events to minimise incidental security exposure. 
Cormac Oliver
Intelligence Analyst
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