Assessing the Iran-Israel-US ceasefire and regional risks

Iran, Israel, and the United States have been adhering to a ceasefire since 8 April. Recent weeks have seen a cessation of US-Israeli coalition strikes inside Iran, alongside a marked downturn in Iranian and Iranian‑aligned militant activity. This excludes the separate Hezbollah-Israel front, which has continued to see Israeli military action and Hezbollah retaliatory strikes despite a declared ceasefire.

During the initial days of the ceasefire, Iranian‑aligned militant groups based in Iraq were blamed for strikes directed at several Gulf states. Iran refrained from conducting large‑scale strikes on Gulf targets until 4 May. However, drone attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan and maritime incidents related to the US port blockade persisted throughout this period.

Operation Project Freedom and renewed strikes

On 4 May, President Trump announced the launch of Operation Project Freedom, describing it as a “humanitarian” initiative intended to guide stranded commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. On the same day, Iran struck the Fujairah oil zone in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and a residential building in Oman’s Musandam governorate.

The UAE reactivated its air defence systems on 5 May, reportedly in response to renewed Iranian drone and missile activity. US officials publicly assessed these strikes as falling short of a ceasefire collapse - likely reflecting the political cost of formally declaring the truce broken and resuming full‑scale military operations.

Iran’s leverage and the Strait of Hormuz

Iran’s strategic objective remains the conversion of physical control of the Strait of Hormuz into political leverage in negotiations with Washington. Following US and Israeli operations on 28 February, Iran imposed a de facto closure of the strait, tightening its grip further in April in response to the US blockade of Iranian ports.

Control of the strait remains one of the most contentious elements of the confrontation, with both Iran and the US seeking to preserve leverage without triggering a return to open conflict. Iranian officials - including the new Supreme Leader - have signalled a shift toward formalised control, announcing plans for a regulatory mechanism over transit, referred to as the “Persian Gulf Strait Authority”.

US signalling, diplomatic timelines and negotiation outlook

Ceasefire durability 

On 6 May, the US Secretary of State declared Operation Epic Fury complete, stating that any future military activity would be defensive rather than offensive. This reflects a US preference to sustain the ceasefire - or, at minimum, a managed stalemate - rather than re‑enter full‑scale conflict.

That said, the US continues to emphasise its right to conduct kinetic action should Iranian behaviour warrant it. Iranian officials have issued parallel warnings of retaliation for any US activity near the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, the risk of miscalculation remains elevated despite the absence of large‑scale operations.

The Iran-Israel - US ceasefire remains fragile but intact. President Trump’s desire to arrive at his mid‑May Beijing meeting with demonstrable diplomatic progress is shaping Washington’s current preference for negotiation over renewed military action in Iran.

Despite Trump’s renewed threats on 6 May to relaunch military operations, the ceasefire is more likely to hold - at least until 16 May, following the conclusion of his state visit to China - than to collapse in the near term.

Likely negotiation outcomes 

The most plausible near‑term outcome is a memorandum of understanding (MoU) rather than a comprehensive nuclear deal. No second round of direct talks has taken place since the Islamabad discussions on 11–12 April, and Trump has stated he will not dispatch a delegation until core differences narrow.

Back‑channel mediation via Pakistan is almost certainly ongoing, while China is expected to assume a more visible diplomatic role following Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi’s 6 May visit to Beijing and ahead of Trump’s rescheduled trip on 14–15 May.

An MoU would provide sufficient mutual confidence to resume maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, extend the pause in kinetic activity, and enable sequential negotiations without forcing commitments that either side would struggle to defend domestically. The principal barrier to a more durable agreement remains differing demands related to Iran’s nuclear programme.

Escalation risks and scenarios 

Both sides are expected to retain the capacity for limited escalation, using the threat of renewed hostilities as a negotiating lever. The US retains the option of conducting contained strikes against tactical Iranian targets to extract concessions without re‑initiating a full military campaign.

Iran - most likely via the IRGC - could target critical Gulf infrastructure to demonstrate retained strike capability. Such action would likely be limited in scale and intensity to avoid provoking a US response. However, if Washington concludes that Iranian leadership cannot form a unified negotiating position in the coming weeks, the risk of ceasefire collapse and a renewed US - Israeli campaign will increase. An uncontained series of coalition attacks would likely follow, with broader regional escalation driven by Iranian retaliation.

Risk management guidance for organisations in the Middle East

Operational preparedness

• Stay abreast of developments by monitoring reliable news sources and Healix Sentinel daily.
• Ensure frequent, effective communication with employees, prioritising official government guidance. Given the high volume of information, structured prioritisation is essential. Test mass‑notification systems regularly.
• Monitor outbound travel viability closely. Liaise directly with airlines and anticipate sudden cancellations or re-routings.
• Establish clear decision‑making frameworks linked to predefined indicators.

Continutiy and evacuation planning

• Identify suitable shelter locations near offices, residences, and key venues, such as basements, interior rooms, or hardened structures offering protection from aerial threats. Ensure staff are familiar with routes and access points; conduct walkthroughs where feasible.
• Maintain an up‑to‑date, centralised personnel database that could rapidly be converted into an evacuee manifest. Develop practical evacuation plans as a precaution.
• Closely monitor supply availability; modest contingency stockpiles can reduce movement during heightened risk periods.
• Liaise with the Healix Global Security Operations Centre (GSOC) for support, evacuation planning, or confidential risk‑mitigation discussions. Contact GSOC@healix.com.