The new era of US foreign policy in Latin America

Trump announced Florida Sen. Marco Rubio as his secretary of state on 13^th November, marking the first time that a Latino holds the position. Rubio is likely to give higher importance to Latin America in the US foreign policy than the previous administrations, in part due to his stark opposition to the current regimes in Venezuela and Cuba. Rubio’s more interventionist stance clashes with Trump’s ‘America First’ approach, though Rubio’s stance has moderated since 2016. The US is likely to firm bilateral deals with Central American countries to control migration, as most of the unregulated immigration in the US southern border originates from countries other than Mexico.

Renewed tensions?

US bilateral relations with Cuba and Venezuela, as well as with other left-wing authoritarian regimes, are highly likely to deteriorate during Trump’s second presidential term.

The president-elect reversed the steps of Obama’s administration to ease sanctions against Cuba during his first presidency in 2017, with Rubio sharing similar views on the issue and opposing the normalisation of relations with the Cuban government. Rubio denounced perceived support from the Biden administration to elections in Venezuelan in July in the context of the Barbados Agreement. While Venezuela’s highest court upheld the re-election of Nicolás Maduro in a highly contested election cycle, Rubio recognised opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia as the legitimate winner. The US is highly likely to change its approach towards Caracas, moving away from a mostly friendly relationship under Biden to a confrontative one under Trump. New rounds of sanctions are almost certain to be imposed against Cuba and Venezuela, with an emphasis on leaders accused of corruption and drug trafficking.

Shifting dynamics with Mexico

Mexico-US relations over the coming years are likely to centre around cartel violence and the renegotiations of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), slated for 2025 and into 2026.

Trump’s perception that the opioid crisis is the responsibility of Mexican cartels is expected to lead to tensions with Mexican President Claudia Scheinbaum, underscored by Trump’s comments on sending Special Forces to Mexico to kill cartel leaders. However, Scheinbaum has shown a higher willingness to use the security forces to combat cartel operations instead of following a ‘hugs not bullets’ approach, which is liable to ease tensions if the trend continues. Trump’s recent comments about relocating manufacturing back to the US raised concerns among companies currently operating in Mexico. While the USMCA supposedly excludes Mexican imports from Trump’s proposed tariff, he claimed a 25% tariff would be imposed unless Mexico stops fentanyl from crossing the border. Although the claims are more likely to intimidate the Mexican government over being realistic threats, the US is likely to push for a renegotiation of the USMCA to favour American interests, particularly the car industry and agriculture.

Advice for organisations and personnel operating in Latin America

• Anticipate protest activity outside US Embassies and Consulates over the coming weeks. Some countries where unrest risks are higher include Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti.

• Monitor for an uptick in anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in Cuba and Venezuela, as well as other left-wing authoritarian regimes.

• Where it meets organisational needs, ensure all personnel remain neutral on social media and refrain from making public statements of opinion about the US elections.

• Ensure access to multiple reliable news channels and multi-source intelligence advisories, such as Healix Sentinel Risk Management Platform, to keep abreast of bilateral relations between the US and Latin America, as well as new rounds of tariffs and sanctions.